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HOW TO STAND STILL WITHOUT REALLY
TRYING: A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW MEXICO
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
ALBERT E. UTTON*

Stephen Potter has coined several phrases such as "How to win
without actually cheating,"' and in the same vein, perhaps the most
appropriate descriptive phrase for New Mexico's performance record
on unifying its administrative procedures would be "How to stand
still without really trying." The twin primary goals of an Administrative Procedures Act should be to assure minimum requirements of
fairness applicable to all agencies and to establish uniformity in the
procedures followed by agencies in carrying out their legislative and
judicial functions. But, as Professors Kern and Sax of Harvard have
pointed out, the goal of fairness is the more fundamental of the two,
and "to a considerable extent, uniformity is achieved as a by-product
of a code of minimum procedural requirements." 2 Thus, any good
administrative procedures act should establish minimum standards of
fairness for all agencies which, in turn, lead to a good deal of
harmony in the procedures used by the various agencies, while at the
same time allowing for the different needs of different agencies.
When appraising the New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act,
one may be tempted to look at those provisions of the Act that deal
with the procedures themselves and to skip over the definitions section, using it only as a reference for understanding the remainder of
the Act. The introductory definitions are, however, the key to the
entire Act. Specifically, the term "agency" is of prime importance in
that it determines the scope of the Act. The initial crossroads decision as to the relevance of the entire Act is made in this very first
definition of what is an agency. One can follow either an inclusive or
an exclusive approach. Under the inclusive approach, all agencies are
included except those that are specifically excluded in the Act. New
Mexico chose, instead, to follow the opposite approach so that under
§ 4-32-2(A) all agencies in New Mexico are excluded except those
* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. B.A., University of New
Mexico, 1953; M.A. (Juris) (Oxon.), 1959.
1. S. Potter. Gamesmanship, or the Art of Winning Games Without Actually Cheating
(1948).
2. Curran and Sacks, Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act, 37 Boston U. L. Rev.
70, 97 (1957).
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which are specifically placed by law under the Administrative Procedures Act. As a result, in New Mexico we have a reasonably good
Administrative Procedures Act which establishes minimum rules of
fairness and uniformity of procedures but which applies to no one.
We are, therefore, faced with the cumbersome requirement of
amending the Act every time a new commission or agency is created,
or every time the political will can be marshaled to place an existing
agency under the Administrative Procedures Act. We *are, in New
Mexico, in danger of having something akin to a road that leads to
nowhere-a law that applies to no one. Recent experience with the
Human Rights Commission indicates that perhaps the only time the
legislature will want to put an agency under the Administrative Procedures Act is when it is displeased with the agency and punishes it
by placing it under the Administrative Procedures Act;3 the legislative equivalent of banishment to the penalty box. In this instance,
the legislature has required the Human Rights Commission, as a condition precedent to receipt of its appropriation, to place itself under
the Administrative Procedures Act by its own rule-making power.4
This is an inept way of going about it. The Administrative Procedures
Act itself excludes all agencies except those "specifically placed by
law"' under it, and to have an agency place itself under the Administrative Procedures Act is half a loaf at best, for what the rule
granteth, the rule can also take away. 6
The 28th Legislature in Senate Joint Memorial number 10 stated
in part that "there is no standardized procedure to govern the conduct of administrative hearings by state agencies, boards, bureaus,
commissions and institutions in New Mexico; and much confusion
exists because of the multitude of varying practices and procedures
in the conduct of such administrative hearings .... " We now have
standardized procedures, but they apply to no one, and still much
confusion exists because of a multitude of varying practices. Our 200
plus7 agencies, boards, bureaus, commissions and institutions in New
Mexico continue undirected on their diverse paths with their idiosyncratic procedures. We have accomplished something akin to the
3. Mayer v. Public Employee's Retirement Board, 81 N.M. 64, 463 P.2d 40 (1970).
4. Albuquerque Journal, March 29, 1970, at A-6, col. 6. N. Mex. Session Laws, ch. 89, p.

337 (1970).
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-32-2(A) (Supp. 1969).
6. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-32-23 (Supp. 1969) contains conflicting language saying the act
applies to agencies made subject to it "by agency rule or regulation." However the conflict
is resolved, the criticism is still relevant.
7. In 1967 the number was reported as being 263. Governor's Comm. on Reorganization
of State Govt., Interim Report, p.i. (15 Nov. 1967). In 1970 Governor Cargo put the

number at 259 of which 224 were active. Albuquerque Journal, June 26, 1970, at F-2, col.
2.
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proverbial boy sneaking into the circus tent; we have made the appearance of moving forward while, in fact, moving nowhere at all.
This is always a trick which requires some considerable skill.
In the meantime, the job of unifying administrative procedures in
New Mexico is still to be accomplished. Nonetheless, we have on the
books an Administrative Procedures Act worth commenting upon.
Taken as a whole, it is a commendable effort and, if made effective,
would be a vast improvement over the confusing "no man's land" of
administrative practice that reigns supreme in the Land of Enchantment. It should be made applicable to the administrative agencies of
New Mexico. It has many admirable features, but it also has some
shortcomings that should be corrected.
With the view that this Act offers great potential, this article will
briefly discuss some of the strengths and some of the weaknesses of
the New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act and suggest ways
that it could be improved.
Rule-Making
Section 4-32-4 establishes rule-making prerequisites and in so
doing, formulates procedures by which notice and hearings are
afforded individuals having an interest in them. This section is
broadly written so as to permit variations to fit different agency
situations, but the minimum standard of affording all interested persons opportunity to present their arguments is preserved. This is
extremely important in an age in which we are particularly in need of
providing vehicles for the citizen to participate in those decisions
affecting his life. The New Mexico legislation follows the lead of the
Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act 8 in going beyond the
Model Act in an attempt to provide notice to interested parties. The
New Mexico Act requires agencies to publish notice of rule-making
hearings unless otherwise prescribed by law in newspapers and in
trade, industrial or professional publications "as will reasonably give
public notice to interested persons." 9 Also, notice is required to be
given to any person who asks that notice be given to him, with "the
request to be renewed yearly, as the agency directs by rule."' 0 This
concept is borrowed directly from the innovative Massachusetts approach which assures that groups with special interests in the work
and regulations of a particular agency can be assured of being kept
abreast of that agency's action.
The section on rule-making procedures does allow for considerable
8. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 30A, § 3 (1966).
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-32-4(1) (Supp. 1969).
10. N.M. Stat. Ann § 4-32-4(2) (Supp. 1969).
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variation, and in particular it allows an agency to respond promptly
to emergency situations by allowing the notice period to be
shortened when "necessary for the preservation of the public peace,
health, safety or general welfare ... or the public interest.", I A time
limit is placed upon such emergency rules, even though it is phrased
more indirectly and, therefore, less clearly than it might have been.
When emergency rules "will" remain in effect for longer than 60
days, the agency must initiate the ordinary rule-making procedures
by giving notice of the rule-making proceeding within 7 days.' 2 This
requirement of starting rule-making procedures within 7 days might
conceivably interfere with an agency's attempt to handle an
emergency situation, and it would seem that the situation would
have been better handled by a simple statement that "an emergency
regulation or amendment shall not remain in effect for longer than
three months unless during that time the agency gives notice and
holds a public hearing as required by this section." 1 3 This would
have limited emergency regulations to a reasonable three-month
period and, at the same time, it would have freed an agency from
rule-making procedures while it was trying to meet an emergency. As
a minor criticism, once again the legislature was not as explicit as it
might have been in stating the sanction for failure to follow the
rule-making procedures. A simple statement that "no rule hereafter
adopted is valid unless adopted in substantial compliance with this
section" would have left no room for doubt. However, § 4-32-2
makes it mandatory upon an agency to follow the rule-making procedures contained in this section, so there should be little room for
confusion.
One last criticism of this section on rule-making procedures is that
interpretive rules and general statements of policies are not exempted
from the rule-making procedures. The motives of the legislature in
not exempting interpretive rules and general statements of policy
were undoubtedly laudable. The whole idea behind the rule-making
procedures is to bring the actions of the agency out in the open,
allow citizen participation and thereby avoid so far as possible the
making of secret law. Ironically, by forcing interpretive rulings and
general policy statements to follow the rule-making procedures of
the Administrative Procedures Act, fewer interpretive rulings will be
made and, therefore, there will be more secret law. As Kenneth Culp
Davis says, "One of the major failings of many agencies is reluctance
11. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-32-4(B) (Supp. 1969).
12. Id.
13. Glidden & Utton, An Administrative Procedure Act for New Mexico, 8 Natural
Resources J. 114, 126 (1968).
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to clarify the law they administer. Everything should be done that
can be done to encourage agencies to move toward earlier clarification."' 4 He goes on to point out that two of the principal tools for
clarifying the law are interpretive rules and general statements of
policy, and that "good legislation should avoid any kind of new
barriers to issuance of interpretative rules and general statements of
policy."' s Putting these two principal weapons for clarification of
the law under the requirements of ordinary rule-making procedure
undoubtedly places an impediment in the way of their use and,
therefore, will be counter-productive so far as clarification of the law.
It is entirely admirable to give all interested parties the opportunity
to participate in decisions which affect them, which include interpretive rulings and general statements of policy. However, as Professor Davis points out, the choice is not between party participation
and no party participation, because with these impediments there
will be fewer interpretive rulings and fewer general statements of
policy; therefore, not only less party participation, but less clarification of the law. Davis rightly, therefore, would opt in favor of
clarifying the law through the frequent use of interpretive rulings and
general statements of policy, and to accomplish this end, agencies
should be encouraged to use them by exempting these two means of
clarifying the law from the ordinary requirements of rule-making.
Publicationof Rules
The publication of rules provisions contained in § 4-32-6 are
entirely desirable. The basic suggestions included in the revised
Model State Procedure Act have been followed,' 6 with the modification that the burden of publication has been placed upon the State
Records Administrator in conformity with similar duties imposed
upon him by the existing State Rules Act.' " Subsection 3 falls short
of requiring a complete compilation of the federal type, with a register and code in which all regulations are centrally compiled, published and made available. It allows the state records administrator to
omit from the compilation any rule which would be unduly cumbersome and expensive to publish; but it does require that notice which
states the general nature of the omitted rule be carried in the central
compilation. This section presents a clear compromise between a
complete register and code and an incomplete one, but the expense
of a complete one would undoubtedly be considerable, and not jus14. K. Davis, Administrative Law: Cases-Text-Problems 583 (1965).

15. Id.
16. Handbook of the Natl Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 201,
212 (1961) (hereinafter cited as RMSAPA).

17. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 71-7-3 (Supp. 1969).
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tified by the amount of use of the compilation.'8 Also, a description
of the general nature of the omitted rule is carried in the central
compilation, and any omitted rule is required to be made available at
the adopting agency. Section 4-32-7 opens new channels for citizen
participation. It provides that any interested person may petition an
agency requesting that it promulgate, amend or repeal any rule, and
requires the agency then to take definite action within thirty days by
denying the petition in writing, stating its reasons, or initiating the
requested rule-making proceedings. This could be a useful tool in
encouraging agencies to clarify the law they administer.
DeclaratoryJudgments
Sections 4-32-8 and 4-32-9 provide additional mechanisms for
clarifying the law. Section 4-32-8 has many virtues, primary among
which is the liberal approach it takes toward declaratory judgments. It
allows the plaintiff to ask for a declaratory judgment regarding any
administrative action which "interferes with or impairs, or threatens to
interfere with or impair, the interests, rights, or privileges of the plaintiff." This broadly written standing provision is further expanded by
the explicit statement that "any representative association, including
but not limited to trade associations, labor unions or professional organizations" has standing to bring a declaratory action. This is highly
desirable, in that "standing" is broadly granted to allow the affected
person to ask for a declaratory judgment without having to run the risk
of actually breaking the law before he can have it clarified. The court
reports are rife with examples of the citizen being forced to risk being
prosecuted in order to find out whether a proposed course of action is
lawful. Government employees have been unable to find out whether
they could lawfully be poll watchers under the Hatch Act;" 9 salmon
workers have had to choose between losing their means of livelihood
or risking exclusion from the U.S. as the way to test the meaning of
administrative regulations;2 0 a bank has been forced to risk losing its
membership in the Federal Reserve System to test the lawfulness of
an administrative ruling. 2' It is certainly in the interest of all to have
the law clarified at as early a date as possible, and the declaratory.
judgment provisions of the New Mexico Administrative Procedures
Act will be useful tools in clarifying the law.
However, regarding the principle of exhaustion of remedies,
§ 4-32-8 goes badly astray. It follows the Revised Model Act and
specifically says that a declaratory judgment may be rendered
18.
19.
20.
21.

F. Heady, Ad Proc Legis in the States 33-40 (1952).
United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
Int'l Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954).
Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426 (1948).
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"whether or not the plaintiff has requested the agency to pass upon
the validity or applicability of the rule in question." 2 2 Thus, all of
the arguments for exhaustion of administrative remedies, such as
making the maximum use of the experience and thinking of the
administrative agency to aid the court when it does make its decision, and using efficiently the time and energies of the courts, are
ignored. The sentence should have provided exactly the opposite: "a
declaratory judgment may not be rendered unless the plaintiff has
first requested the agency to pass upon the validity or applicability
of the rule in question." 2 3 It can be argued that the courts will have
the advantage of the agency's thinking, since § 4-32-8 requires that
"the agency shall be made a party to the action." But, nonetheless,
the courts' time will be taken up on cases that might well have been
dealt with satisfactorily by the agency without even requiring attention by the courts. It really boils down to a choice between requiring
exhaustion or direct and quick access to the courts by by-passing the
agency. The arguments for using the experience of the agency and
efficiently using the time of the courts which underpin the concept
of exhaustion are the most persuasive.
Section 4-32-9 is, on the whole, an admirably phrased section
which provides for the early clarification of the law by agency declaratory rulings. But, unfortunately, the entire section is subverted and
probably to a great extent made a nullity, because the language of
§ 4-32-8 short-circuits administrative agencies in the declaratory
process. There is little incentive for a party at odds with the agency
to petition the agency for a declaratory ruling when he can go directly to the courts without giving the court the opportunity to take
full advantage of agency thinking on the matter. The federal Administrative Procedure Act follows a permissive approach, providing in
§ 5(d): "the agency.., in its sound discretion... may issue a de.
claratory order.... "24 But the Hoover Commission concluded that
this declaratory order provision had not worked to clarify the law,
primarily because such orders were discretionary with the agencies.2 ' Section 4-32-9 is a great improvement over the federal Administrative Procedure Act in requiring the agency to issue declaratory rulings "except when the agency for good cause finds the issuance of such a ruling undesirable." Section 4-32-9 follows the
Revised Model Act in being broadly available to test not only agency
22. RMSAPA § 7.
23. Davis, supra note 14, at 583.
24. 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (Supp. 1970).
25. Commission on Organization of Executive Branch of Government, Task Force Report on Legal Services & Procedures 187 (1955).
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rules but "the applicability of any statutory provision.., decision,
or order", as well. 6
A desirable provision in the declaratory judgment section is that
such cases shall be heard by the District Court of Santa Fe County.
This is sensible from the point of view that this is where most of the
agencies are located and, secondly, it will provide for some uniformity and consistency in treatment of declaratory judgments.
Subsection B of § 4-32-8 contains a potential time bomb, in that
it provides that the District Court of Santa Fe County may take
jurisdiction "upon any matter not otherwise provided for in the Administrative Procedures Act. . . at any stage of a proceeding .... "In
view of the comprehensive review provisions of § 4-32-16, it is difficult to contemplate what matters are "not otherwise provided for,"
but this section raises the potential for interrupting the administrative process at any point and, perhaps, making it possible to delay
and frustrate the administrative process by frequent resort to the
courts as a dilatory tactic. This not only, of course, could be
destructive to administrative action, but would place further burdens
on the time and energy of the courts, and could be a serious flaw in
the New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act. Such attempts to
circumvent the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
should be corrected at the earliest possible time. The only thing that
prevents this provision from being dangerous at the moment is that
the law does not apply to anyone.
Adjudication
The second leg of the big two of the administrative process, rulemaking and adjudicating, is contained in § § 4-32-10 to 15. The
fundamental concepts of justice require a trial-type hearing when the
agency is adjudicating, while rule-making requires the rule-making or
argument type of hearing; and these sections complete the
distinction between the argument type of hearing for rule-making
and the trial-type hearing for adjudicatory proceedings by establishing the procedures and requirements for a fair, trial-type hearing.
Section 10-4-32(10) is one of the most important sections of the act.
It answers a number of preliminary questions that often determine the
scope of the hearing, such as the issues to be heard, right of intervention, the notices required, and the rights of all parties to respond,
present evidence, and make arguments on the issues at stake. The
entire hearing is directed toward building a record, with an eye to
making judicial review possible.
26. See F. Cooper, 1 State Administrative Law 385 (1965).
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Evidence
Section 4-32-11, relating to the rules of evidence to be followed in
agency adjudicatory proceedings came through the legislature fairly
reasonably. The rules of evidence should provide general guidelines
to insure the use of evidence of probative value while taking into
account that informality and efficiency are desirable in most administrative proceedings. One can criticize the New Mexico legislation for the apparently restrictive built-in presumption in favor of
using the rules of evidence as applied in non-jury civil actions in
district courts,2 6 but this presumption is hedged by the reasonably
elastic phrase that "when necessary to ascertain the facts not
reasonably susceptible of proof under those rules, evidence not admissible thereunder may be admitted ...if it is of a type commonly
relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their
affairs." The reference to non-jury civil actions was undoubtedly
necessary to make this section politically palatable, but the "prudent
man" standard should give agencies sufficient latitude to perform
their duties, even though the language of the evidence section overall
is not as direct and candid as it might have been.' "
The New Mexico statute is perhaps slightly superior to the revised
Model Act in that the Model Act does not address itself to one of the
most difficult problems about rules of evidence-that is, what evidence may be relied upon. The New Mexico statute does not explicitly state what evidence may be relied upon, but it could be
argued that the statute implies that evidence that can be relied upon
is that which is "of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably
prudent men in the conduct of their affairs." This language may have
some influence on the New Mexico court but, nonetheless, still intact
in New Mexico is the "residium of legal evidence" rule which requires at least some evidence of a type admissible in court.2 8 It
would have been better if the statute had talked not only in terms of
the admission of evidence, but also had explicitly contained a provision such as: "a finding may be based upon the kind of evidence
commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of
their affairs."' 2 9 The rules of evidence for administrative agencies
must accomplish two primary tasks. They must provide general
guidelines which will insure that a fair and complete hearing will be
given to all interested parties and, at the same time, they must be
27. See Glidden & Utton, supra note 13, at 134.
28. See Ferguson-Steere Motor Co. v. State Corp. Comm., 63 N.M. 137, 314 P.2d 894
(1957); McWood Corp. v. State Corp. Comm., 78 N.M. 319, 431 P.2d 52 (1967); Young v.
Board of Pharmacy, 81 N.M. 5, 462 P.2d 139 (1969).
29. See Davis, supra note 14, at 584 for further discussion, and Cooper, supra note 26, at
410-12.
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flexible enough to be employed by all agencies while preserving the
informality and efficiency that are desirable in administrative proceedings. The New Mexico statute accomplishes these primary tasks.
The standard of the "prudent man" establishes a standard of reliability which allows the agency a good deal of flexibility in admitting
and giving probative effect to evidence, and is strongly influenced
not only by the Model Act, but by the Massachusetts Act.3 o
Subsection B of § 4-32-11 follows the lead of the Massachusetts
Act in requiring the agency to come forth with all of its evidence,
including any records, investigation reports, and documents, so that
it may be made a part of the record. This is desirable in order to
prevent the use of secret reports that are not made a part of the
record and which would therefore be unknown to parties. This
satisfies the basic fairness requirement of opportunity for the parties
to be informed of the evidence so that they may have a chance to
adequately prepare their case.
Official Notice
Although § 4-32-11 (D) is well motivated, it is not thorough in its
treatment of the problem of official notice. It naively requires that
"whenever any office or agency takes official notice of a fact, the
noticed fact and its source shall be stated at the earliest practical
time ...." This would appear to be simple and straightforward
enough and good common sense, but as Kenneth Culp Davis points
out, this requirement could not possibly be followed if the words
were given their literal meaning. 1 Agencies, for example, normally
know the meaning of common words only through official notice.
The fact that New Mexico has a government and that the legislature
has authority to legislate are all matters which are officially noticed.
Therefore, as Davis says, the requirement that parties must be notified of all matters noticed is "perfectly preposterous. The meaning of
every word used has to be noticed. The agency usually does not
know, except through official notice, that an automobile has four
wheels, or that the District of Columbia is not a state. Every case
involves hundreds of thousands of assumed acts; the first sentence of
the first witness may require dozens of factual assumptions by the fact
finders." 3 2 Therefore, because the provision as drafted in the
New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act requires too much, a
different approach should be followed. The most realistic thinking
on the question of official notice has been done by Professor Davis
30. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 30A, § 11(4) (1966).
31. Davis, supra note 14, at 585.
32. Id.
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of the University of Chicago, and he succinctly sets out the pre'
requisites for a satisfactory provision on official notice; it should:
(1) assure that a party adversely affected will have the earliest
practicable opportunity to know of noticed facts which may be
disputable, and their source, (2) make clear that the agency need not
delay its action by allowing a challenge of utterly clear facts such as
that a Chevrolet is an automobile, (3) allow notice of highly probable but nevertheless disputable facts, (4) limit challenges of noticed
facts to submission of written evidence or argument except when
evidence subject to cross-examination is needed, (5) authorize an
agency which takes official notice in the process of preparation of its
final report to determine whether fairness requires that parties be
afforded an opportunity to contest such facts before the decision is
announced, (6) make clear that procedural fairness may require opportunity for cross-examination when the noticed facts are adjudicative, crucial, and doubtful, (7) allow the agency to deny cross-

examination if the agency smells a delay motive and believes that
cross-examination will serve no useful purpose....,,33

To attain these objectives, he suggests a provision as follows:
Official notice may be taken of all facts of which judicial notice may
be taken and of other facts within the specialized knowledge of the

agency, but whenever any officer or agency takes official notice of a
fact which may be disputable, the noticed fact and its source shall be
stated at the earliest practicable time (before or during the hearing,
in the proposal for decision . . .., or in the final report), and any

party shall on timely request be afforded an opportunity to show
the contrary through a written submission of evidence or agument:
Provided, however, that when an agency takes official notice of
disputable facts in the process of preparing its final report, the
agency shall in its discretion determine whether fairness requires that
parties be afforded an opportunity to contest such facts before the
decision is announced; and provided, further, that if a noticed fact is
adjudicative, crucial and doubtful, any party adversely affected by
the noticed fact shall have opportunity for cross-examination unless
the agency in its discretion is satisfied that (1) the request for crossexamination is for purposes of delay, and that (2) cross-examination
will in the circumstances serve no useful purpose." '
The central issue in the official notice problem is how to reconcile
the needs of procedural fairness-principally the right to know and
rebut all information used by the agency in reaching its decision on
the one hand, and the use of agency expertise based on experience
and specialized information on the other.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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Equally impractical is the requirement in § 4-32-1 1(D) (3) that
the record in the adjudicatory proceedings shall include a "statement
of matters officially noticed." This should be deleted, simply from
the point of view that realism would not permit a record of all
matters officially noticed. However, because the absolute language of
the New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act is "preposterous,"
the courts and lawyers will, of course, not follow it literally, but will
follow a common sense approach. It would have been better if the
Administrative Procedures Act had given them some guidelines to
follow in exercising this common sense discretion, e.g., whether the
facts are "adjudicative, disputed and critical."
ProposedDecisions
Section 4-32-1 1(J) deals broadly with the problems relating to
proposed decisions. In particular, § 4-32-1 1(J) (2) deals with an
agency appellate system where initial or tentative decisions are made
by a hearing officer and then are subject to a review and final decision by the agency itself. In such cases, it is important that interested
parties should have notice of any initial decision made by a hearing
officer which is adverse to them, prior to the time of review and final
decision by the agency. Subsection (J) (2) implies that such initial
decisions shall be made available to the parties but it does not explicitly say so. It would have been much better to say "that the final
decision shall not be made until a proposal for decision is served
upon the parties, and an opportunity is afforded to each party adversely affected to file exceptions and present briefs and oral argument to the officials who are to render the decision. The proposal for
decision shall contain proposed findings of fact and proposed conclusion of law; each conclusion of law shall be supported by authority of reasoned opinion."'3 S
Instead of this direct approach, the New Mexico statute simply
says that the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
submit briefs with exceptions for consideration by the agency "in all
cases where recommended initial decision or tentative decision is
subject to further agency review. . . ." Again, one would infer that of
necessity, in order to submit exceptions to a proposed decision, one
must have had access to that proposed decision. It would have been
better drafting to have explicitly required the service of that report
upon the parties.
Section 4-32-12 sets forth what must be contained in final agency
decisions and orders. The basic policy involved is that such decisions
and orders must be amenable to judicial review. This section insures
35. See Glidden & Utton, supra note 13, at 136.
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this by requiring that written final orders and decisions include all
findings of fact and conclusions of law. It also requires some explanation of the basis for the agency decision such as requiring that findings of fact be "accompanied by a concise ... statement of the
underlying facts supporting the findings." However, there is one
regrettable omission which not only affects the symmetry of this
section, but also the capability of the court to review. The findings
of fact should be accompanied not only by a concise statement of
the underlying facts, but each conclusion of law should be supported
by authority or by reasoned opinion. This omission could easily be
corrected by inserting immediately after the phrase which says that
all findings of fact shall be accompanied by a "concise statement of
the underlying facts supporting the findings," a sentence as follows:
"each conclusion of law shall be supported by authority or by
reasoned opinion. '"I "
Ex Parte Consultations
The section on ex parte consultations' I is designed to protect
against the contamination of the judging process by limiting off-therecord communications with those who are to decide the case. The
basic policy is to insure that all parties have notice of communications relative to their case, so that they may have an opportunity to
prepare and rebut. The New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act
directs itself at insulating the decision-maker from off-the-record
communications between the agency and the parties, but it inadequately insulates the decision-maker from being biased by offthe-record prosecutorial influence. This issue is recognized only in
the disqualification section, § 4-32-15(H), which goes part way to
meet the prosecutorial influence problems raised in Wong Yang Sung
v. McGrath.' 8 In this case, the court dealt with a problem of separation of functions where the duties of the prosecutor and judge were
handled by the same person. The court quoted with approval the
report of the Secretary of Labor who said "a genuinely impartial
hearing conducted with clinical detachment is psychologically improbable, if not impossible, when the presiding officer has at once
the responsibility of appraising the strength of the case and of seeking to make it as strong as possible." ' I
When the same agency is engaged in prosecuting and in judging, it
36.
37.
38.
39.
mittee

Id.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-32-13 (Supp. 1969).
339 U.S. 33 (1950).
Id. at 44; Immigration and Naturalization Service, The Secretary of Labor's Comon Ad Proc, 81-82 (mimeo, 1940).

October 19701

NEW MEXICO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDUREACT

853

is highly desirable to separate the two functions in order to avoid
biasing the decision-maker. The New Mexico statute meets this problem in a very "back-door" way in the disqualification section, which
provides that "[n] o officer, employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for any agency in
any case shall, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise
in the decision, recommended decision or agency review except as a
witness or counsel in a public proceeding."'4 It does not in fact say
that a deciding officer can be disqualified if he is advised by an
employee engaged in functions such as prosecuting-but since this
language is grafted onto the disqualification section it is reasonable
to infer that a deciding officer who has been a prosecutor or investigator or who has consulted or been advised by a prosecutor or investigator in that or a similar case can be disqualified-but it would
have been better to say so explicitly.
Also, the ex parte consultation section itself would have been
greatly strengthened by including language such as: "agency members, presiding officers, and staff members may communicate with
each other, except that no one participating in the decision in an
adjudicatory proceeding shall consult with any member of the
agency's staff engaged in investigating, prosecuting, or advocating in
connection with the case under consideration or a factually related
case."41
The New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act does not address
itself to the problem of judges who are subject to the power and
control of prosecutors. This problem was raised in the case of Marcello v. Bonds,4 2 in which the special inquiry officer was subject to
the supervision and control of officials in the Immigration Service
charged with investigating and prosecuting functions. Mr. Justice
Douglas dissenting in that case said with admirable understatement
that "it is hard to defend the fairness of a practice that subjects
judges to the power and control of prosecutors."' 4 The West Virginia case, State ex rel Ellis v. Kelly 4 4 illustrates well this type of
problem. The commissioner of motor vehicles inspected the respondent's business and recommended that his license to sell automobiles should be revoked. Notice of hearing was given, the hearing
was held before a deputy commissioner who was appointed by and
subject to the control of the commissioner. The commissioner testi40. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-32-15(H) (Supp. 1969).

41. Glidden & Utton, supra note 13, at 137.
42. 349 U.S. 302 (1955).

43. Id. at 319.
44. 145 W. Va. 70, 112 S.E.2d 641 (1960).
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fied regarding his investigation and the deputy commissioner duly
revoked the license, based on the commissioner's testimony. The
court, in holding due process was violated, said:
"It can hardly be contended that the commissioner, in the making of
the investigation and in testifying before the deputy commissioner
appointed by him and responsible to him, beyond any reasonable
probability, did not become biased and prejudiced in the matter
being heard. It would seem to be beyond human experience and
expectation for impartiality to result where the officer is the investigator, prosecutor, witness, and trier of facts.., the deputy commissioner could not have acted with impartiality in the consideration
of relator's rights. His actions were for the commissioner, and could
not be expected to be free and independent of his influence." 4 5
This kind of situation could have been covered by the New Mexico
Administrative Procedures Act, but was not. Language could and
should have been inserted such as: "no staff member who is consulted about the decision in any adjudicatory proceeding shall be
responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of any
officer engaged in investigating, prosecuting, or advocating, except
that agency members may supervise all functions of their subordinates."' 6 Thus, the New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act
has glaringly omitted one of the two traditionally prime sources of
contamination of the adjudication process, and it has inadequately
handled the other.
Disqualification
The New Mexico provision for disqualification is exemplary in
that it provides for the replacement of a disqualified officer who
otherwise, in spite of his unsuitability, would be allowed to decide
the case under what the courts call "the stern rule of necessity.' 4
Under this doctrine courts have upheld decisions made by personally
biased decision-makers because there was no other person legally
authorized to make the decision. The unsavory result of resorting to
necessity is well illustrated by the Massachusetts case of Mayor of
City of Everett v. Superior Court,4 8 in which the Mayor was not
only accusor and prosecutor but the judge as well, in a proceeding to
remove three license commissioners. The lower court found that "the
action of the mayor.., was not consistent with an open and unprejudiced mind; and that the charges were not made in good faith
but were made as a part of a plan to carry out the mayor's de45. Id. at 644.
46. Glidden & Utton, supra note 13, at 137.
47. See cases collected by F. Cooper, supra note 26, at 349.
48. 324 Mass. 144, 85 N.E.2d 214 (1949).
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termination to remove the commissioners." 4 9 In spite of this finding
by the lower court, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reversed because "even if the mayor were biased ... the Legislature ...made no provision that any other officer could act in case
the mayor was disqualified by reason of bias or prejudice."' 0
The New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act anticipates this
situation in § 4-32-15(H) by providing "the agency shall by rule
provide for the appointment of a fair and impartial replacement of
the person disqualified. If the replacement is disqualified, or in any
case not otherwise provided for, a replacement shall be appointed by
a justice of the Supreme Court."
JudicialReview
Judicial review stands as the final capstone of the entire edifice
that the Administrative Procedures Act has been building. The provisions relating to notice and the opportunity to prepare and rebut
are all designed not only to provide a fair hearing, but also to build a
record for judicial review. Judicial review stands as the ultimate assurance of due process afforded to any party to an adjudicatory
proceeding. The New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act provides
judicial review to "any person suffering legal wrong because of any
agency action or adversely affected or aggrieved by the action or
inaction."'" Thus, standing is broadly granted for judicial review of
administrative action.
Whereas in rule-making and adjudicatory proceedings the Administrative Procedures Act is primarily concerned with establishing
minimum standards of fairness and uniformity is only a secondary,
although valuable, result; in the area of judicial review, uniformity
should be the primary goal. Unfortunately, this uniformity is subverted significantly in the New Mexico Administrative Procedures
Act by the provision that "nothing in this section prevents resort to
other means of review ...because of constitutional provisions or
otherwise prescribed by statute."" 2 The New Mexico Administrative
Procedures Act does contain a simplified, unitary appeal procedure
that could be looked to as a model to be followed, but, unfortunately, it also preserves the multiplicity of existing appeal procedures, and the appeals procedures in New Mexico are a confusing
patchwork.5 3 The statutory and constitutional appeals procedures
49. Id. at 150-51, 85 N.E. 2d at 219.
50. Id.
51. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-32-16(c) (Supp. 1969).
52. Id. at (A).
53. See unpublished paper by John M. Eaves, Forms of Proceedings for Judicial Review
of Decisions of the N.M. Corp. Commission 6. (The School of Law, U.N.M., 1970).
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grew up like Topsy, with different procedures being enshrined in the
law with the creation of each new agency. Different appeal procedures have even been established within the same agency as different functions were added one by one to the initial ones. For
example, the New Mexico Corporation Commission has nineteen
different statutory appeal provisions and three constitutional
methods for judicial review."s A lawyer trying to penetrate this
particular homegrown thicket would find that the procedures for
reviewing commission actions relating to pipeline companies5 5 differ
"substantially from review provisions relating to other carriers."' 6
"The resulting patchwork is characterized by a lack of uniform pattern comparable to that of the old fashioned crazy-quilt." ' '
Section 4-32-16(E) appears to be the most destructive in nullifying
the attempts to attain some sort of uniformity in judicial review of
administrative action. This subsection unnecessarily and gratuitously states that the form of proceeding for judicial review "shall
be any special statutory review proceeding" or "any applicable form
of legal action." This section does not appear in the Revised Model
Act, but was borrowed almost verbatim from the federal Administrative Procedure Act,5 8 which, unlike the New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act, does not provide a model for a unified method
for judicial review. Therefore, grafting the section of the federal act
onto the New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act is something
like mixing apples and oranges.
As if § 4-32-16(E) were not bad enough itself, it is a duplication
of Subsection (A). Subsection (A) follows the Revised Model Act" 9
in providing "nothing in this section prevents resort to other means
of review, redress or relief. . . "; then, like a man who wears both a
belt and suspenders just to be on the safe side, § 4-32-16(E)
reiterates the same point by borrowing the language of the federal
Administrative Procedure Act as well. The explanation is undoubtedly political. It was necessary to preserve familiar pro54. Id. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 69-7-14 (Repl. 1961); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-27-68 (Repl.
1960); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-2-9 (Repl. 1962); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-5-2, 8 (Repl. 1962);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-9-16 (Repl. 1962); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-10-34 (Repl. 1962); N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 58-20-12 (Repl. 1962); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-21-11 (Repl. 1962); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 58-22-8 (Repl. 1962); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-24-13(2) (c) (Supp. 1969); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 58-26-13 (Supp. 1969); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-27-6 (Supp. 1969); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 44-1-6 (Repl. 1966); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-13-8 (Repl. 1962): N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-21-7
(Supp. 1969); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-31-2 (Supp. 1969); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-4-19 (Supp.
1969); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 69-10-13 (Supp. 1969).
55. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-4-9 (Repl. 1960).
56. Eaves, supra note 53, at 23.
57. Cooper, supra note 26, at 603-04.
58. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 10, 60 Stat. 237 (Repealed 1966).
59. RMSAPA § 15(a).
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cedures-a de novo here and a mandamus there-in order to placate
special interests sufficiently to get the Administrative Procedures Act
through the legislature.6 The Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in their comments to the review provisions of the Revised
Model Act anticipate these practical considerations:
"[1If there is but one mode and scope of review, the state procedural structure is greatly simplified. On the other hand, local considerations, including practical considerations connected with
obtaining adoption of the Model Act, may indicate or even require
the retention, at least
for the moment, of the pre-existing methods
'6
of judicial review. I
In New Mexico these "local" practical considerations have severely
eroded the goal of uniformity for judicial review procedures. This
means that in New Mexico, "a baffling heterogeneity of methods
exists., 6 2 The multiplicity of methods of review which is preserved
and continued by the New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act
would qualify for what Professor Davis calls a "system cunningly
planned for the evil purpose of thwarting justice and maximizing
fruitless litigation..."6 3 Such a system "for the purpose of creating
treacherous procedural snares and preventing or delaying the decision
of cases on their merits" would "insist upon a plurality of remedies ...."6 ' The New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act so insists, with a vengeance. Historically, lawyers are extremely cautious
creatures, and the drafters of the Administrative Procedures Act were
no exceptions. They were so fearful of giving up any old forms of
review that they crossed themselves twice to make doubly sure that
no old form of review was replaced-a move against the interests of
both the litigant and his lawyer; against the lawyer's interest, because
it wastes his energy and time in attempting to choose the right proceeding; against the litigant's interest because it increases his legal
costs. Through our New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act we
should follow the admonition of the New York Court of Appeals and
ensure that "when a suitor shows a right to some relief the court
grants the relief to which he is entitled, unrestricted by the form of
the proceedings brought by the aggrieved person." ' 6 The way to
ensure this would be to provide through the Administrative Pro60. Cognizance of such considerations led to similar multiplicity of review procedures
being suggested prior to the enactment of the N. Mex. A.P.A. See, Glidden & Utton, supra
note 13, at 143.
61. Cooper, supra note 26, at 822.
62. Id. at 603.
63. Davis, supra note 14, at 458.
64. Id.

65. N.Y. Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, 163 N.Y.S. 2d 409, 413-14 (1957).
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cedures Act a uniform procedure for reviewing administrative action.
"The cure is easy. Establish a single simple form of proceeding for all
review of administrative actions. Call it 'petition for review.' "66
Section 4-32-16(E) of the New Mexico Administrative Procedures
Act provides such a "single simple form." Under this provision all
one need do is file a "notice of appeal" which shall include "a
concise statement" of jurisdictional facts, the facts of the grievance,
the grounds "upon which the petitioner contends he is entitled to
relief," and "the relief to which the petitioner believes he is entitled." Then the court may grant the relief to which the petitioner is
entitled without concerning itself with the labels of the proceedings,
much as the federal courts have done by using the injunction as a
general "utility remedy." 6 The Administrative Procedures Act itself
gives the court on review a full arsenal-"the court may set
aside... reverse, remand.., or... compel agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed ...."6 8 The appeals are made to a
single court-the court of appeals-so that a unitary body of precedent can be developed. 69 The New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act does provide a means of judicial review that would be
simple, economical, and readily available. 7" The only unfortunate
aspect is that we in New Mexico did not firmly support these admirable provisions for uniform review procedures. All we did was add
one more proceeding to the existing "baffling heterogeniety," like
another religion for added insurance. Appropriately, a recent study
of the State Corporation Commission concluded that, in view of the
fact that the New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act would leave
on the books the existing nineteen different procedures for reviewing
State Corporation Commission actions, no benefit could be seen "in
leaving the present nineteen in force and also adopting an additional
new one."' One can only say it is worth paraphrasing the Davis
dictum: "The cure for plurality of procedures is a single procedure." 7 2
The New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act in its first
sentence on judicial review expressed adherence to the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, but also provides for exceptions when justice dictates otherwise. Section 4-32-16(B) allows review of judicial action "at any stage of any agency proceeding,"
66. Davis, supra note 14, at 458-59.
67. Id.
68. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-32-22(A) (Supp. 1969).
69. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-32-16(F) (Supp. 1969).

70. Cooper, supra note 26, at 607.
71. Eaves, supra note 53, at 37.
72. Davis, supra note 14, at 464.
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upon showing "serious and irreparable harm or the lack of adequate
and timely remedy otherwise," and thus allow the court to review
administrative action when review after the agency's final decision is
rendered would be too late to render relief. It is true that an agency's
interlocutory action during a proceeding may have an immediate
adverse affect on the parties which requires immediate judicial review
or there will be nothing left to review. For example, in the case of
Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission,7 3 the
Supreme Court held that administrative remedies need not be exhausted where the agency is threatening to disclose confidential information. Once the veil of privacy is pierced, all of the review in the
world after the administrative proceeding has been completed will
not put back together the broken vessel of confidentiality. Review
must be granted prior to the breach of confidentiality, or never.
Likewise, the Supreme Court has held that exhaustion of remedies
does not apply where a board is about to make a decision on a record
which includes reports which the plaintiff contends should have been
excluded. 7 4
The courts have not, however, always been consistent. The case of
Eastern Utilities Associates v. SEC7 particularly illustrates the type
of case in which if the interlocutory action of the agency is not reviewed at once, it cannot be reviewed after the administrative
remedies have been exhausted. In this case, the commission gave
notice of the hearing in Philadelphia, and denied a motion to change
the place of hearing to Boston, even though the principal offices of
the companies and the residences and places of business of all
prospective witnesses were in or near Boston. The petitioners sought
immediate review in the Court of Appeals, but the court denied their
petition and -held that "administrative orders of a merely preliminary
or procedural character are not directly or immediately reviewable.""6 Thus, no matter what a reviewing court might think after
the entire process has been exhausted, it would not have been able to
have done anything about changing the site of the hearing after the
hearing had already occurred. The result was a total denial of review
of the issue of the location of the hearing. Section 4-32-16(B) of the
New Mexico Act is broad enough and flexible enough to allow review
of such interlocutory orders while at the same time making the obstacles to such review sufficient to inhibit capricious and dilatorious
petitions for review.
73.
74.
75.
76.

306 U.S. 56 (1939).
Robertson v. Chambers, 341 U.S. 37 (1951).
162 F.2d 385 (lst Cir. 1947).
Id. at 386.
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CONCLUSIONS
The New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act is a significant
stride forward. It provides minimum fairness in the making and publishing of rules and the handling of adjudicatory hearings. In so
doing, uniformity of proceedings is accomplished as a by-product
throughout, and even in spite of the diluting provisions, uniformity is
encouraged in judicial review proceedings. Therefore, every effort
should be made to matshall the political will to place New Mexico
agencies under the Administrative Procedures Act. The criticisms
contained herein should not be construed as opposition to the Act as
a whole. We should make the Act applicable and improve it as well.
Would it be asking too much to have one's cake and eat it too?

